Bitwise Premium RWA AUSD (Ethereum) Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 16% of deposit

Driven by sUSDai −30% 6% · PRIME −30% 5% · PST −30% 4% · −100% 86% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

sUSDaiMarketChainlink33%of vault · bad debt · $5.76mOracle exposure 3%

37%of vault · $6.35m33%of vault · $5.76m3%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD86% LLTV0x3f00…d246Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$10m8 vaultsToken:0x0b2b…5ef9Allocation: 37% of the vault · $6.35m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 6% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $6.35m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PRIMEHybridChainlink29%of vault · bad debt · $5.08mOracle exposure 3%

33%of vault · $5.62m29%of vault · $5.08m3%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD86% LLTV0xb794…7d11Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$19.65m14 vaultsToken:0x19eb…f7f6Allocation: 33% of the vault · $5.62m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $5.62m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PSTMarketChainlink24%of vault · bad debt · $4.07mOracle exposure 3%

26%of vault · $4.5m24%of vault · $4.07m3%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD86% LLTV0xa565…8ac0Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$10.03m9 vaultsToken:0x22ae…d4c7Allocation: 26% of the vault · $4.5m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $4.5m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Unallocated (incl. $803,974 idle)not lent into any market — no collateral exposure5% · $803,643

5%of vault · $803,643——

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to9%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $1.57m

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices PRIME, PST, sUSDai0x21f7…73ca9% of vault · $1.57mdrainable if it is compromised

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

10 scenarios · 8 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	16%	up to 86%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	16%	up to 86%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(4)
	16%	up to 86%	Instant
	16%	up to 86%	Instant
	5%	up to 29%	Instant
	—	up to 9%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	7 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	7 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 7 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Ownersingle key (EOA)0x510f…bd6f

Curatorsingle key (EOA)0xb593…de82

Sentinels1 · 1 EOASafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

single key (EOA)0x8c75…c3cc

Allocators1 · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x1288…9a4b

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

7 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.