Belem RWA EURCV

Risk reportEthereum0xd6d4…48ec

Risk

Depositing into Belem RWA EURCV means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

33%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 9% of deposit

Driven by mGLOeuro −30% 7% · WBTC −30% 2% · cbBTC −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 91% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

mGLOeuroHybrid78%of vault · bad debt · $4.12mOracle exposure 8%

86%of vault · $4.52m78%of vault · $4.12m8%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ EURCV77% LLTV0x2b43…47b9

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$404,8122 vaultsToken:0x2f8b…7702Allocation: 86% of the vault · $4.52m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 7% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $4.52m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 8% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WBTCMarketChainlink9%of vault · bad debt · $455,249Oracle exposure 1%

10%of vault · $509,7639%of vault · $455,2491%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WBTC is priced via WBTC / BTC × BTC / USD, quoted in EUR / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseWBTC / BTCMarketChainlinkBTC / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteEUR / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ EURCV86% LLTV0x4072…a8e4Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$408.04m90 vaultsToken:0x2260…c599Allocation: 10% of the vault · $509,763

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $509,763 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink2%of vault · bad debt · $117,469Oracle exposure 0.2%

2%of vault · $130,2972%of vault · $117,4690.2%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD, quoted in EUR / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteEUR / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ EURCV86% LLTV0xba75…6e47Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$493.48m102 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 2% of the vault · $130,297

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $130,297 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink2%of vault · bad debt · $98,381Oracle exposure 0.2%

2%of vault · $109,6232%of vault · $98,3810.2%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(composite)

wstETH is priced via Custom price feed for wstETH / ETH × ETH / USD, quoted in EUR / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseCustom price feed for wstETH / ETHMarketETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteEUR / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ EURCV86% LLTV0x44d6…dd90Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$911.4m107 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: 2% of the vault · $109,623

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $109,623 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

steakEURCVAUM / rate<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $1.14Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $2.24<0.1%of vault · $1.14<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

AUM / rate(exchange-rate)

Priced off an exchange rate / AUM — insulated from spot depegs, but exposed to rate-provider corruption.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ EURCV92% LLTV0x078f…55f1

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.2m4 vaultsToken:0xbeef…db2fAllocation: <0.1% of the vault · $2.24

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.24 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

oTFYeMarketRedStone<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $0.34Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $1.12<0.1%of vault · $0.34<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· RedStone(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ EURCV77% LLTV0x396d…50ebRedStone

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.181 vaultsToken:0xc6de…84c5Allocation: <0.1% of the vault · $1.12

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.12 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+1 market with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds · 2 control points

Up to9%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $483,396

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, eurSAFO0x21f7…73ca1% of vault · $78,585drainable if it is compromised
RedStone·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices oTFYe0x6906…4472<1% of vault · $0.78drainable if it is compromised
Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices mGLOeuro8% of vault · $404,809mispriceable if these feeds lie
On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices steakEURCV<1% of vault · $1.10mispriceable only via the issuing contract


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	9%	up to 91%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	9%	up to 91%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(3)
	9%	up to 91%	Instant
	9%	up to 91%	Instant
	—	up to 9%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner4-of-8 multisig0xbbac…f918

Curator4-of-8 multisig0xbbac…f918

Sentinels1 · 1 multisigSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

1-of-4 multisig0x040e…3a47

Allocators2 · 1 multisig · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x1cda…ba02
1-of-1 multisig0x22d4…676a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

1 reading could not be refreshed this run.

Updated 47min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Belem RWA EURCV

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle