KPK wARS Yield

Risk reportEthereum0xb5ce…b938

Risk

Depositing into KPK wARS Yield means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

50%of your deposit from curator fee extractionOnly smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to <1% of deposit

Driven by USDC −30% <1% · USDT −30% <1% · −100% <1% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

USDCMarketChainlink0.5%of vault · bad debt · $38,267Oracle exposure 0.2%

0.7%of vault · $52,8710.5%of vault · $38,2670.2%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ wARS77% LLTV0xde7b…fc7bChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$507.16m6 vaultsToken:0xa0b8…eb48Allocation: 0.7% of the vault · $52,871

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $52,871 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WETHMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $9.99Oracle exposure 0.2%

0.2%of vault · $11,259<0.1%of vault · $9.990.2%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ wARS63% LLTV0x8442…1b79Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.417b29 vaultsToken:0xc02a…6cc2Allocation: 0.2% of the vault · $11,259

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $11,259 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $0.65Oracle exposure 0.6%

0.6%of vault · $45,430<0.1%of vault · $0.650.6%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(exchange-rate)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ wARS63% LLTV0xa8cf…70ecChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$881.59m107 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: 0.6% of the vault · $45,430

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $45,430 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.6% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDSHybridChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $0.64Oracle exposure 0.1%

0.1%of vault · $9,366<0.1%of vault · $0.640.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ wARS63% LLTV0x8387…045cChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$17.8m22 vaultsToken:0xa393…7fbdAllocation: 0.1% of the vault · $9,366

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $9,366 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $0.64Oracle exposure 0.2%

0.2%of vault · $11,259<0.1%of vault · $0.640.2%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ wARS63% LLTV0xe8d2…ccf2Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$499.19m102 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 0.2% of the vault · $11,259

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $11,259 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

USDTMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $0.0013Oracle exposure 0.2%

0.2%of vault · $13,432<0.1%of vault · $0.00130.2%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ wARS77% LLTV0x24a7…5f5cChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$612.87m2 vaultsToken:0xdac1…1ec7Allocation: 0.2% of the vault · $13,432

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $13,432 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WBTCMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $0.0013Oracle exposure 0.3%

0.3%of vault · $19,651<0.1%of vault · $0.00130.3%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(exchange-rate)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ wARS63% LLTV0x1622…d14aChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$410.36m90 vaultsToken:0x2260…c599Allocation: 0.3% of the vault · $19,651

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $19,651 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Unallocated (incl. $6.91m idle)not lent into any market — no collateral exposure98% · $6.91m

98%of vault · $6.91m——

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to2%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $124,989

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, WETH, USDC, sUSDS, USDT0x21f7…73ca2% of vault · $124,989drainable if it is compromised


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	<1%	up to <1%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	<1%	up to <1%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(4)
	—	up to 2%	Instant
	<1%	up to <1%	Instant
	<1%	up to <1%	Instant
	0%	up to <1%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner5-of-8 multisig0x8b88…a537

Curator2-of-5 multisig0xeacf…c5f5

Sentinels1 · 1 multisigSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

5-of-8 multisig0x8b88…a537

Allocators4 · 1 multisig · 3 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x331d…1204
single key (EOA)0xaf15…9440
2-of-5 multisig0xeacf…c5f5
single key (EOA)0xf0cf…2a75

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

7 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 8min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

KPK wARS Yield

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle